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Abstract
The paper investigates the kind of dependence relation that best
portrays Machian frame-dragging in general relativity. The question
is tricky because frame-dragging relates local inertial frames to distant
distributions of matter in a time-independent way, thus establishing
some sort of non-local link between the two. For this reason, a plain
causal interpretation of frame-dragging faces huge challenges. The
paper will shed light on the issue by using a generalized structural
equation model analysis in terms of manipulationist counterfactuals
recently applied in the context of metaphysical enquiry by Schaffer
(2016) and Wilson (2017). The verdict of the analysis will be that
frame-dragging is best understood in terms of a novel type of depen-
dence relation that is half-way between causation and grounding.
Keywords: General relativity; frame-dragging; causation; ground-
ing; structural equation modelling; Mach’s principle.
1 Introduction
It is virtually impossible to address the problem of the origin of inertia in
spacetime theories without mentioning Ernst Mach and his “The Science of
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Mechanics” (Mach, 1883). Indeed, Mach’s views on inertia have been dis-
cussed and analyzed at length in the philosophical literature. The consensus
among Mach’s commenters is that his discomfort with the origin of inertia
in Newtonian mechanics comes from epistemological considerations filtered
through empiricist inclinations. For Mach, it is highly unsatisfying to link
inertia to Newtonian absolute space for the simple reason that such a space
is unobservable. If the aim of physics – and science in general – is to provide
a picture of the world based on experience, then there is no place in this
picture for elements that elude experience in one way or another.
At this point, however, the consensus breaks down as how much further
Mach pushed these considerations. On a prudent reading, it seems that Mach
simply argues for a mere redescription of the role of inertia in classical me-
chanics, that is, that inertia should not be referred to absolute space, but
to a suitably defined reference frame (e.g., in the case of Newton’s bucket
experiment, the inertial effects arising should be referred to the distant back-
ground of fixed stars). A more radical reading instead suggests that Mach
has in mind not just a mere redescription of classical mechanics, but a brand
new physical theory in which inertia originates from the overall distribution
of masses in the universe (see Huggett and Hoefer, 2017, section 8). It is
no mystery that Einstein saw this “radical Mach” as one of his main in-
spirations in his quest for general relativity (GR). Although there are still
disputes about whether GR fully complies with a radical interpretation of
Mach’s views (see for example Barbour and Pfister, 1995, chapter 3), it is
a well-established fact that, under certain physical conditions, the theory
predicts that local inertial frames are determined to a certain degree by the
surrounding material distribution. This is the case for frame-dragging effects,
such as the Einstein-Lense-Thirring effect, according to which a gyroscope
orbiting a huge rotating mass distribution will show a precession that is di-
rectly related to the angular momentum of the distribution (Pfister, 2007).
In a nutshell, frame-dragging effects imply that the axes of a local inertial
frame are not fixed and independent of the surrounding material distribu-
tion, which in turn means there is no such thing as an absolute space acting
as a fixed reference for an inertial compass. Section 2 will provide a very
brief introduction to rotational frame-dragging effects in GR, from modest
Machian effects implying that local inertial frames are determined both by
the state of motion of surrounding matter distribution and the condition
of asymptotic flatness at infinity, to fully Machian effects dictating that in-
ertial frames are defined with respect to the overall matter distribution in
the universe. The key point to be highlighted is that, in any case, the de-
termination relation established does not depend on time. This apparently
means that local inertial frames would instantaneously “feel” any change in
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the surroundings’ state of motion, irrespective of how far away in space such
change is triggered. This may be a source of unease for those inclined to
consider frame-dragging as a result of some sort of physical interaction. In
fact, the absence of a retarded mechanism underlying these effects might lead
them to consider frame-dragging as an instance of action-at-a-distance. This
would in turn raise delicate questions for metaphysicians who want to read
a causal dependence off from the frame-dragging mechanism, for they would
then apparently be forced to accept some kind of superluminal causation.
Although this would not by itself be a fatal blow to a causal interpretation of
frame-dragging (after all, one might simply take it to show that in GR there
is superluminal causation), still one might take this controversial issue as a
motivation to pursue an alternative metaphysical analysis. This is exactly
what is done in section 3, where the framework of structural equation models
(SEM) will be discussed. The framework helps to analyze the dependency
relations underlying a set of correlations by (i) constructing a mathematical
model of such dependencies and (ii) counterfactually testing the model in
a manipulationist fashion. This tool has been so far used mainly in social
science to extract causal information from huge datasets but, recently, some
metaphysicians have noted that the framework works in principle with any
kind of determination relation, and in particular with grounding. The aim of
this paper is to apply the SEM framework to shed light on the issue of finding
the “right” dependence relation depicted by frame-dragging: the results of
our analysis are presented in section 4 and further discussed in section 5.
2 Rotational frame-dragging effects in GR
The conceptual path that leads to general relativistic frame-dragging can
be traced back to Newton’s bucket argument. This thought experiment was
meant to show that the relative rotation of water with respect to the bucket’s
walls was neither necessary nor sufficient to ground the centrifugal forces
responsible for the concavity of the water’s surface. Newton’s conclusion
was that centrifugal forces arose as a result of water rotating with respect
to absolute space, since all possible inertial frames were tied to this latter
entity. Mach famously replied to this challenge by pointing out that all we
can observe is that the curving of the water’s surface is not determined by its
state of motion with respect to the walls of the bucket, but is determined by
its state of motion relative to the frame of the fixed stars. We do not know,
Mach went on to say, whether the curving of the water’s surface would be just
the same if all the matter of the fixed stars were removed from the universe,
nor whether a curving effect might in fact be produced by mere relative
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rotation with respect to the walls of a bucket, if the latter were “several
leagues thick”. GR vindicates Mach’s point of view on dragging effects in
that (a) in asymptotically flat universes any local inertial compass would
nonetheless feel the presence of a surrounding rotating matter distribution,
and (b) in non-asymptotically flat universes inertial frames appear to be, in
some models at least, completely determined by the overall mass distribution.
With these facts in mind, we can say that dragging effects in GR come in
different degrees of Machianity. In the following, we will review the most
important results, placing them in an ascending scale of Machianity from (a)
to (b), without any pretense to be exhaustive or mathematically rigorous.
The less Machian frame-dragging case was first discussed in the early
years of GR, by Einstein, Lense, and Thirring (here we draw from Ciufolini
and Wheeler, 1995, section 6.1, and Misner et al., 1973, sections 18.1 and
19.1). Consider a slowly rotating ideally spherical body with mass M and
angular momentum J in a stationary, asymptotically flat spacetime. In the
weak field limit we can use linearized gravity, that is, we can decompose the
metric gµν into a flat Minkowski background ηµν plus a perturbation term
hµν (throughout the paper we will set G = c = 1):
gµν ≈ ηµν + hµν , (1)
and define:
h¯µν ≡ hµν − 12ηµν
(
ηαβhαβ
)
. (2)
The general solution of the linearized field equations will then be:
h¯µν = 4
∫ Tµν(τ,x′)
|x− x′| d
3x′, (3)
where τ = t− |x−x′| is the “retarded time”, which models the fact that big
enough perturbations of the background would propagate from the source at a
finite velocity as gravitational waves. However, in the present case, velocities
are too low to produce such big perturbations. Moreover, in general, by
expanding hµν in powers of x
′
|x−x′| ≡ x
′
r
, we see that the higher-order radiation
terms die out as 1
r
so, if the radius of the body is big enough, no retardation
effect will be seen.
In this context, the infinitesimal 0i (i = 1, 2, 3) components of Einstein’s
field equations can be written in the Lorenz gauge as:
δh¯0i = 16piρvi, (4)
with ρ the density and vi the linear 3-velocity of the mass distribution. The
solution will be:
h¯0i = −4
∫ ρ(x′)vi(x′)
|x− x′| d
3x. (5)
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In the end, by passing to spherical coordinates, the metric outside the body
will approximately be (in the appropriate (Kerr) gauge, where J = (0, 0, J)):
ds2 = −
(
1− 2M
r
)
dt2 +
(
1− 2M
r
)−1
dr2 + r2
(
dθ2 + sin2θdφ2
)
−
−4J
r
sin2θdtdφ.
(6)
The off-diagonal term h¯tφ in (6) comes from (5) and from the fact that
J = ∫ x×(ρv)d3x, and can be considered some sort of potential in analogy to
the magnetic potential in electrodynamics. More precisely, it is a “dragging
potential” because it can be shown that a gyroscope orbiting the massive
body would precess – with respect to an observer at infinity – with angular
velocity:
Ω = −12∇×A, (7)
where A =
(
0, 0,−2J
r
sin2θ
)
and ∇ is the covariant spatial derivative. (7)
is thus a gravitational analogue of Faraday’s law of induction in electrody-
namics. Without entering into further mathematical detail, we already see
what is Machian about the result (7): since the gyroscope determines the
axes of a local inertial frame, the state of motion of the mass distribution
influences such a determination in the vicinity of its surface. Note that Ω
varies considerably at different locations. For example, near the poles the in-
ertial frames rotate in the same direction as the massive body, while near the
equator the inertial frames rotate in the opposite direction. We also see what
is not Machian here (basically, everything else): the rotation of the massive
body and the precession of the gyroscope are referenced to the infinity fixed
ab initio without reference to any mass distribution. Formally, this means
that (7) is solved modulo a constant of integration that the asymptotic flat-
ness condition fixes to be Ω(∞) = 0. In this sense, for r → ∞ we get the
“true” inertial frame, which suspiciously looks like an absolute space in the
Newtonian sense.
A slightly more Machian dragging effect arises if we consider a slowly
rotating massive spherical shell. To determine the metric inside this body, we
just note that, in the case J = 0, this metric would be the flat Minkowskian
one ηµν . Hence, for J 6= 0, in the weak field limit we can apply again (1), hµν
again being a rotational perturbation small enough that the resulting metric
is stationary (in order to avoid higher order contributions form gravitational
waves). With this machinery in place, we can apply the same reasoning
above, thus finding that the axes of the gyroscope near the center of the
shell would be dragged with respect to infinity. This situation is slightly
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more Machian than the previous one because, in the reference frame of the
gyroscope, the metric inside the shell appears flat, thus hinting at the fact
that the matter distribution defines “its own” inertial frames inside the shell.
However, the Machianity of the situation ends here, because the rotations
involved are not defined relationally but refer, again, to infinity. Furthermore,
the approximations used in the model make it too much of a toy model. For
example, we need to impose physically implausible conditions on the stress-
energy tensor in order to keep the radius of the shell constant, this in turn
makes it troublesome to “connect” the metric inside the shell with that on
the outside.
More physically realistic models of slowly rotating mass shells with a time
dependent radius (in order to model their expansion/contraction) are due to
Brill and Cohen (1966); Lindblom and Brill (1974); Pfister and Braun (1985).
Roughly, these authors apply a slightly more sophisticated perturbation ap-
proach to the outside of the shell. Given that, by Birkhoff’s theorem, the
metric outside a static spherical distribution of matter in an otherwise empty
universe is the Schwarzschild one, they start by a rotationally perturbed ver-
sion of it, which can be generically written as:
ds2 = e2αdt2 − e2βdr2 − r2
[
dθ2 + sin2θ (dφ− ωdt)2
]
, (8)
where ω = 2 J
r3 , and e
2α and e2β are appropriate functions of the shell’s
mass determined by the field equations plus the state equation for matter.
The metric inside the shell is taken to be flat, although written in rotating
coordinates depending also on the radius of the shell. In this way, the authors
are able to give a full description of the system, including the connecting
region on the shell. The angular momentum J = (0, 0, J) within a region r
depends on the tφ component of the stress-energy tensor through:
J =
∫ r
0
∫ ∫
T tφ
√−gdθdφdr. (9)
Again, we do not need to go too much into technicalities here: the interesting
point for us is that all these authors recover frame-dragging results that are
a generalized form of (7):
e−αΩ = −12e
α∇×A, (10)
where the factor e−α accounts for the increase of rotation rate of the shell
due to the gravitational slowing of the clocks close to the shell with respect
to those at infinity.
Lynden-Bell et al. (1995) further generalize these results by considering
N nested freely falling shells, the metric between any two shells being of the
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form (8), and taking the continuous limit (i.e. N → ∞). They find the
interior variation of the metric’s perturbation ω to be:
∂ω
∂r
= −6eα+β J
r4
. (11)
If we assume asymptotic infinity, so that ω → 0 for r →∞, we can integrate
(11) to get the overall perturbation distribution over space:
ω = 2
(
W
r3
J +
∫ ∞
r
W
r′3
∂J
∂r′
dr′
)
, (12)
where W is an appropriate weight function that depends on eα+β and r.
Roughly, (12) is a measure of how much dragging comes from any spatial
region of the model. Hence, this model nicely describes a case where local
inertial frames are partially determined by the overall matter distribution in
the universe. This is the most Machian scenario still falling in the category
(a).
The subsequent step is to render the model even more Machian by as-
suming that there is no infinity region, i.e. by imposing that the universe is
closed. In this case, it is more useful to define a new coordinate 0 < χ < pi
such that sinχ = r
rmax
, rmax being the maximum size of the universe. Simple
geometrical considerations lead to a new version of (11) appropriate for the
closed case:
∂ω
∂χ
= −6eα+β ∂r
∂χ
J
r4
. (13)
When integrating (13) in order to get the closed universe equivalent of (12),
we have to keep in mind that there is no more boundary condition ω(∞) = 0
because there is no infinity. The only thing we can do is to integrate with
respect to an arbitrarily chosen point χ∗:
ω − ω∗ = 2
(
W∗
r3
J +
∫ χ∗
χ
W∗
r′3
∂J
∂χ′
dχ′
)
. (14)
Equation (14) tells us that, since there is no privileged inertial frame at
infinity, the angular momentum distribution just contains information about
the relative rotations of inertial frames at different points. The icing on
the cake is given by a mathematical result proven by the authors in this
context, which states that the total angular momentum of a closed universe
is necessarily zero. This is the most Machian setting among those considered
so far, in which dragging effects arise. Equation (14) comes very close to
Mach’s idea encompassed in his reply to Newton, i.e. that the concavity
on the surface of a rotating mass of water was just due to the dragging of
7
the water’s inertial frame by the relative counter-rotation of the surrounding
matter in the entire universe.
These results can be further generalized by considering small perturba-
tions of a FLRW metric:
ds2 = dt2 − a2(t)
[ 1
1− kr2 + r
2
(
dθ2 + sin2θdφ2
)]
, (15)
a(t) being a scale factor and k=-1,0,1 representing the (constant) spatial
curvature. The perturbed metric d˜s2 will feature off-diagonal elements cor-
responding to such perturbations. The key point to consider is that, when we
want to “project” d˜s2 on the unperturbed background ds2, we have a num-
ber of gauge degrees of freedom associated with the background’s underlying
symmetries. In this particular case, the unperturbed metric exhibits spatial
homogeneity and rotational symmetry which, in particular, means that the
associated Killing vectors are 3-dimensional. In this context, Noether’s the-
orem implies that any conserved quantity at a given instant of cosmic time t
features – at the first perturbational order – only the 0i (i = 1, 2, 3) compo-
nents of the stress-energy tensor and, hence, only the “spatial constraints” of
the Einstein’s field equations are involved. From all of this, we can calculate
the off-diagonal h0i terms in d˜s
2 as functions of 3-Killing displacements ξai
(a = 1, . . . , 6) by integrating the set of equations:
δh0i = faξai. (16)
(16) is a general form that includes (12) and (14) as particular cases, fa
being a six-component integration constant. Note that no timelike derivative
appears in this relation. In the case of an open universe, fa is fixed by the
boundary conditions at infinity (as in the case ω(∞) = 0 in (12)) but, if the
universe is closed, some freedom will remain as to choose fa, meaning that
only relative motions are definable, in the same Machian spirit as (14). This
latter result has been later extended – albeit in very particular gauges – to
any FLRW cosmology, thus entirely fulfilling Mach’s ideas (see Bic˘ák et al.,
2007).
To sum up, rotational frame-dragging effects are perhaps best understood
if we bring in again the analogy with electrodynamics, which is apparent
in (7). Such effects are induced by a dragging potential encoded in the
off-diagonal terms representing small perturbations of a background metric
(be it Minkowski, Schwarzschild, or FLRW). The very general form of these
perturbations is (16), whose right-hand side is determined by the mass-energy
distribution in the region of interest (as, for example, in (4)). In all these
cases, however, the magnitude of δh0i is so small that no retarded action of the
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form (3) will arise because no substantial gravitational radiation that literally
carries the perturbation will be produced. This is an obvious disanalogy with
the electrodynamic case, where physically realistic potentials – especially in
long-range interactions – are retarded. The immediate consequence of this
lack of retardation in the general relativistic context is that introducing any δ-
sized change in the mass-energy distribution of a system will instantaneously
alter the magnitude of the dragging effects felt by local inertial frames. For
example, if we take a spherical shell of matter centered on a point P in
a FLRW universe and give it a small rotation about P , the result of the
perturbation is “felt” instantaneously at P . As we noted above, this “effect”
is instantaneous on a constant-t hypersurface in the model due to the fact
that its existence is derived from the spatial constraint equations, which can
be thought of as one part of Einstein’s field equations (note, en passant, that
no violation of general covariance is implied, i.e. frame-dragging effects do
not identify a privileged foliation of spacetime).
This is of course a bit of a problem – especially in a cosmological context
– if we wish to say that local inertial frames are causally affected by the
surrounding matter distribution. In fact, causation is usually understood
as a diachronic relation (causes precede their effects) but, even if we are
willing to relax this condition enough to admit at least synchronic causation,
we are left with something that looks a bit like spooky action-at-a-distance.
And even if we bite this bullet, still we will face the challenge of explaining
whether, and if so why, this action amounts to – or does not amount to –
some kind of superluminal physical influence.
The problems in this context are made even worse by the fact that no well-
established philosophical account of causation is able to provide a neat anal-
ysis of dragging dependencies. Conserved quantity approaches à la Salmon-
Dowe are notoriously ill-defined in GR, and also causal property theories
such as Alexander Bird’s dispositional monism are at odds with many foun-
dational aspects of the theory (see Lam, 2010, and references therein). The
situation is not better for counterfactual theories such as Lewis’ or Wood-
ward’s, given that the GR’s dynamical geometry gives no well-established
standard to evaluate a counterfactual change against the actual situation
(see Curiel, 2015, for a general discussion, and Hoefer, 2014, for the specific
case of frame-dragging). The first difficulty regards a counterfactual situa-
tion involving a local change that leaves everything else untouched. In this
case, even if we are working with a model of GR that admits a well-posed
initial value formulation and we express this “change” as a tiny modifica-
tion of the metrical and material properties in a small neighborhood on the
initial spacelike surface, such a change would be enough to violate the field
equations, which constrain the happenings on each surface, thus making any
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attempt to evolve the situation to see “what would had happened if we had
made this small change, leaving everything else as is in the actual world”
far-fetched. The second problem regards testing counterfactuals by compar-
ing two models of the theory, corresponding to the actual and counterfactual
situations. In this case, the lack of a standard implies that the way we choose
the counterfactual model is always somewhat arbitrary. This point becomes
evident if we consider the counterfactual situation where all the masses in the
actual world would vanish (decay into the true Higgs vacuum is a concrete
possibility...). We might naturally be inclined to say that, if that happened,
the Minkowski solution would be the best candidate to model the situation.
However, Minkowski spacetime is not the only vacuum solution of Einstein’s
field equations, and no compelling mathematical argument can be made that
singles out this particular solution over the others. Moreover, as is pointed
out in Lynden-Bell et al., 1995, if one were to approach modelling this coun-
terfactual situation via a series of FLRW models with ever-smaller cosmic
mass, then if one starts from a closed/finite universe, as the total cosmic
mass gets smaller and smaller the spacetime becomes smaller, shorter-lived,
and more highly curved, eventually (in effect) vanishing in the limit as cos-
mic mass goes to zero, rather than turning into Minkowski spacetime (or any
other infinite empty spacetime of GR).
The ambiguity problem affects our treatment, for example, in the Einstein-
Lense-Thirring case. As a matter of fact, one can consider the external field
of a spinning nearly spherical massive body in an otherwise empty universe
(Kerr model) and then test the counterfactual “If the body had not spun,
the local inertial frame K at a distance |r| from the body’s surface would not
have precessed” against a Schwarzschild model for a body with same mass
and radius but no angular momentum, thus finding that the counterfactual
is true. In this case, our choice would be more robust because of Birkhoff’s
theorem. However, the problem is still there, and manifests itself in the fact
that there is no objective well-established trans-model identity criterion that
helps us point at K in the starting model and say that the orientation of
the z-axis of the very same K in the second model does not precess. Usu-
ally, physicists make sense of such counterfactuals by stipulation: they map
the perturbed space (the Kerr model, in this example) on the unperturbed
background (here, the Schwarzschild model) in a way that fixes for any point
P in the background its “perturbed” counterpart P ′. This fixing procedure
basically amounts to the condition that P and P ′ are always flagged with the
same coordinate value. In this way, any choice of coordinates on the back-
ground will immediately fix the coordinates in the perturbed space. Thanks
to this stipulation, we immediately see that we can evaluate the above coun-
terfactual without particular worries. However, this approach to trans-model
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identity just works on a case-by-case basis and, therefore, cannot be adopted
as a formal backbone of a general counterfactual analysis of causation.
In the following section we will consider a different approach to the anal-
ysis of causation, one which, in our opinion, is a promising framework for
investigating the nature of dependence relations in GR.
3 Structural equation model analysis
The umbrella title “structural equation modelling” designates a set of math-
ematical tools developed as early as the 1960s in parallel with the rise of
database management systems. The main scope of these tools is to analyze
distributions of data by best-fitting them in graph structures that explain
some “mechanism” (in a loose sense) of interest underlying these distribu-
tions. So far, these models have been mainly used in sociology and psychol-
ogy to, e.g., test the hypothesis that intelligence (under a certain operational
measure) strongly influences academic performance. It is worth noting that
this framework is tentative in nature and, as such, it progresses on a trial-
and-error basis. First, a certain graph structure is proposed, which describes
how data - sorted out by different kinds of variables - are related based on
some explanatory hypotheses, and then it is tested, e.g. by statistical meth-
ods, how well actual data fit the network of dependencies posited: if the
results are unsatisfactory, a modification of the starting hypotheses is made
and the entire process is performed again.
The SEM framework naturally lends itself to causal analysis and in par-
ticular to the evaluation of causal inferences (See Pearl, 2000, for one of the
first attempts to spell out this approach in detail). For our purposes, the
following example will suffice (see Schaffer, 2016, section 2, for an extensive
presentation and discussion of the framework in a philosophical context).
Imagine we have a dataset that shows a systematic correlation between the
members of two distinct samples X and Y , and we hypothesize that there is
some sort of causal mechanism that makes it the case that Y depends on X.
The starting point is to define an “endogenous” variable y ∈ Y representing
the dependent condition and an “exogenous” variable x ∈ X representing the
independent condition. We further require that these variables take values
from an appropriate set, for example the binary set {0, 1}, “0” meaning that
the condition does not obtain and “1” meaning that it obtains. The next
step is to provide a set of formal relations (e.g. equations) showing how y’s
value has to be evaluated on the basis of x’s value. We can symbolize this
relations by y ←= f(x), where the symbol “←=” makes the conjectured direc-
tion of dependence explicit. Hence, given an assignment of value a to x, the
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model gives the corresponding value f(a) for y. The intuitive interpretation
of this formal dependence is straightforward: the “wiggling” of x always (if
f is deterministic) triggers a corresponding change in y in a “f” way, but
the opposite does not hold. We immediately see that the best way to render
this analysis of dependence in terms of wiggling is by using interventionist
counterfactuals: “If an intervention on x had set its value to a, then y would
have taken on the value f(a)” (see Woodward, 2016, for a survey of the
interventionist framework). This also makes it clear why the independent
variable is called exogenous: it is the one that is subjected to any process
external to the system, i.e. an intervention. Finally, the model is tested
against the dataset to see how accurately f captures the correlations pattern
between the two samples. Although it most naturally and powerfully applies
to generic or “type” causation, the method can be used to model both generic
and singular (“token”) cases of causation. In this way, the SEM framework
permits both qualitative and quantitative causal analysis, and can be easily
implemented into causal search algorithms (as in the case of Ramsey and
Winberly’s Tedrad project, whose codebase is freely available on GitHub).
It is instructive to consider how the framework analyzes a textbook case of
direct causation, that is, the shattering of a window caused by the throwing
of a stone.
In this case we have two variables: “T” formalizing whether or not the
fact that a (sufficiently heavy) stone is thrown obtains, and “S” formalizing
whether the fact that the window shatters obtains. Both variables take values
from the binary set {0, 1}. Based on everyday experience, we hypothesize
that S causally depends on T and we model this dependence as S ←= T . The
graph corresponding to this model is:
T S
The model does not need any further tweaking or supplementation to
avoid an incorrect back-tracking conclusion (S → T ), as the Lewisian analysis
of causation does, because it has the “right” counterfactual patterns already
built in. As such, this framework is more parsimonious than the Lewisian
one, because it dispenses with the talk of possible worlds, small miracles, and
the like. It might be objected that this framework, contrary to the Lewisian
spirit, is not reductive since the notion of intervention, which plays a key
role in the evaluation of the causal link, presupposes an underlying causal
process of the same nature as the one analyzed. While we agree that the
SEM framework is non-reductive with respect to causation, we do not see it
as a problem with the consistency or the reliability of the inferences drawn
in this context since any intervention on T does not necessarily presuppose
that we already have causal information about the relationship we want to
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characterize. Also, here we can see explicitly that the model accounts equally
well for the case where a stone is thrown through a window (type) and for
the case where Leonardo throws a stone through Monika’s window (token).
Now imagine that there are two stone throwers instead of one. Clearly,
the above model would become inaccurate and should be supplemented with
a second exogenous variable T ′ and a second dependence equation S ←= T ′.
The correct graph would thus be:
T
S
T ′
This shows how the framework easily handles cases of causal overdeter-
mination. Similarly, the framework can account for cases of causation by
absence: roughly, the dependence of y on the absence of x is modelled by the
structural equation y ←= 1− x.
It is important to stress the fact that there is no upper limit to the
complexity of a model in this context. The graph can have (infinitely) many
links and also a branching structure. Graphs can even be cyclic, to model
situations (not uncommon in social sciences) where variables can mutually
influence one another, or feedback loops exist. It is common, however, to only
consider directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) meeting two consistency constraints:
(i) that an intervention on a certain variable influences all the other variables
downstream but no variable upstream, and (ii) that the topology of the graph
is not closed. This restriction is particularly natural when modelling token
causation.
The SEM framework has recently attracted the attention of the metaphys-
ical community because it can be easily generalized to any kind of dependence
relation that is generative or directed in nature and can be modelled by a
partial ordering, grounding being exactly one of these relations. A. Wilson
(Wilson, 2017), shows that the analysis of all the major cases of causation
can be replicated for grounding. For example, the stone/window case can be
translated using the same variables and the same structural equation to the
case of the existence of Socrates grounding the existence of singleton Socrates
or, in general, the existence of singletons being grounded in the existence of
their respective members. According to Wilson, the only difference between
the stone/window case and the member/singleton one lies in the mediating
principles involved, that is, the set of background conditions invoked to jus-
tify the model. In the first case but not in the second a subset of laws of
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nature is invoked (note how this law-based demarcation criterion does not
mention or imply that causation has to be a diachronic relation). For this
reason Wilson renames causation as “nomological causation” and grounding
as “metaphysical causation”, going further in arguing that, in fact, standard
causation and grounding are at most two species of a genus relation “causa-
tion” taken as primitive. However, in order for Wilson’s unifying framework
to work, two slight modifications of the original SEM scheme are in order.
First of all, we need to liberalize the notion of intervention. Grounding coun-
terfactuals involve “metaphysical interventions”, some of which are impossi-
ble. Moreover, given that we accept metaphysically impossible interventions,
we need to adopt a non-standard semantics of counterpossibles which does
not treat them as trivially true. For example, for the structural model S ←= T
(T being whether Socrates exists, and S being whether singleton Socrates
exists) to work, we have to evaluate the counterpossible “if an intervention
had prevented singleton Socrates from existing, then Socrates would not have
existed” as false (see Wilson, 2018).
For our purposes we do not need to go as far as accepting Wilson’s (con-
troversial) unification thesis, but we will take on board the view that the
SEM framework, including Wilson’s suggestion to look for the presence of
lawlike background conditions, is a powerful tool to analyze the nature of de-
pendence relations, especially where standard analyses are in trouble, such
as in the case of frame-dragging in GR.
4 Frame-dragging as a non-standard deter-
mination relation
We ended section 2 by pointing out that counterfactual theories of causa-
tion are in trouble in the GR context. One can thus ask what progress we
really made by adopting SEM’s framework, given that it heavily relies on
counterfactuals. In reply we note that, first of all, in this context the truth
values of counterfactuals are not evaluated by comparing possible worlds,
but by computing the values of the structural equations. In section 2 we said
that in GR it is not so straightforward to consistently and non-arbitrarily
single out a model that represents a counterfactual situation to a given one
(recall the disappearing masses case). This puts possible worlds semantics
in trouble because it undermines the notion of “nearness” of possible worlds
(which vacuum possible world is closest to ours?). In our case we do not
need any metaphysical notion of similarity among possible worlds to evalu-
ate counterfactuals, we just need the posited structural relations among the
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relevant variables of the model. This shifts the arbitrariness involved in the
evaluation of counterfactuals from a metaphysical to a methodological per-
spective, which is in fact closer to the way physicists engage in counterfactual
reasoning.
The problems with interventionist counterfactuals are also mitigated be-
cause our counterfactual semantics is much more liberal than the standard
interventionist one, allowing for any kind of physical and metaphysical inter-
vention, possible or impossible. The worry that, say, a physically impossible
intervention would render the analysis void because it would violate Ein-
stein’s field equations is unfounded, since the variables we intervene upon
are part of the structural equations, whose adoption is of course justified by
invoking the field equations, but which are nonetheless distinct from these
field equations. In other words, by setting physically or even metaphysically
impossible interventions on the variables, we are not feeding garbage into the
theory’s dynamics, thus getting garbage in return, but we are just testing the
set of relations internal to our structural model. It might be the case that,
in the end, the model turns out to be at odds with GR in one way or the
other (e.g. local curvature dropping to zero when mass is increased), which
only means we have to modify the structural model.
To make this point more vivid, let us consider first the problem of trans-
world identification. Clearly, the use of this methodology would dramatically
ease the evaluation of counterfactual changes. Indeed, now it is no more mat-
ter of looking how, say, the very same region S of spacetime in a possible
world W looks in a near world W ′, because any counterfactual change of
S translates into the correspondent change of value of the variable s repre-
senting S in the corresponding structural equations. Further, let us consider
counterfactuals involving small local changes in a model of GR that leave
the rest of the universe untouched. In this case, all we have to do is to
take an appropriate (e.g. fine-grained enough) structural model, “zoom in”
the particular situation by looking at the variables that describe the local
state of affairs, change their values as required, and then see if and how this
change affects the “global” variables in the structural equations. Obviously,
we cannot perform such a manipulation directly on a solution of Einstein’s
field equations. However, we can use the structural model to “transition”
from the starting solution of the field equations (compatible with the start-
ing values of the variables figuring in the structural equations) to a new
one which encloses the changed state of affairs. The necessary condition is
that the structural model be fully compatible with the laws of GR, other-
wise the changed state of affairs fixed by the new values of the structural
variables might not be encoded in any solution of the field equations. Note
that this “transitioning” between solutions of GR is the SEM counterpart to
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Lewisian possible worlds’ vicinity. Now, however, the similarity comparison
between different states of affairs is not justified by metaphysical consider-
ations, but just by pragmatic ones (i.e. that the structural model linking
the two solutions works well in capturing the “backbone” of dependencies
for both situations). It is easy to see how this mitigates also the issue of
evaluating the counterfactual situation in which all the masses in the actual
universe disappear: just construct an informative enough structural model
that rightly captures the dependencies in the actual world, set the material
variables in the dependence chain to zero, and see which vacuum model of
GR is compatible with this new situation.
The above discussion is very schematic and is meant to hint at the fact
that the advocated SEM framework fares better than standard frameworks,
at least in cases where it is already clear what one is looking for (the frame-
dragging case being one of those, as we will see in a moment). However,
we are not claiming that the generalized SEM framework is the panacea for
the troubles with counterfactual analyses of dependencies in GR. This line of
research is still in its infancy, so a detailed assessment of how well the SEM
framework fares in general in GR is still to come.
Having argued that the SEM framework is a promising approach to coun-
terfactual reasoning in GR, we can now focus on the concrete case of rota-
tional frame-dragging, and see if Wilson’s analysis in terms of metaphysi-
cal/nomologic dependence helps us in judging whether causation is involved.
For sure, by using Wilson’s law-based characterization of dependence, the
question of whether the dependence relation between the angular momen-
tum J of the rotating mass and the angular velocity Ω of the precessing local
frame is instantaneous or retarded becomes irrelevant to the causal verdict:
Ω would causally depend on J just in case we have to invoke the laws of
nature in order to justify the structural equation relating them. Put in these
terms, the verdict seems to be trivial: yes, Ω and J are causally related
because in the analysis of the dependence relation involved we must invoke
Einstein’s field equations. However, this verdict would be too hasty. In fact,
as we are going to see, the graph connecting these two variables has many
more nodes to be taken into account.
In section 2 we have seen that all cases of rotational frame-dragging follow
the same scheme. The degree of Machianity of each case then followed from
the particular physical setting considered. We start by giving information
about the material distribution (the equation of state involving density ρ and
pressure p of matter, which in turns determines the stress energy tensor Tµν).
We then give the set of background symmetries (with related Killing vector-
fields) compatible with Tµν (for example, external cylindrical symmetry for
the Einstein-Lense-Thirring case). We then compute the angular momentum
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via (9), and from that we construct a linear perturbation δhµν of the back-
ground. We use the stress-energy tensor to calculate the perturbation via
Einstein’s field equations. In virtue of the symmetries of the background, we
apply Noether’s theorem to find that only the 0i (i = 1, 2, 3) part of the field
equations are involved. We thus find the form of the dragging potential fa
by (16) (or the particular cases (12) and (14)) and, from this, we construct
the vector potential A = (0, 0, fa) by fixing a convenient gauge (e.g. the
Lorenz gauge). Finally, we get to the angular velocity of precession Ω of a
local inertial frame via (10), again by a choice of gauge that fixes the value
of the function eα. Hence, the graph of the structural model is:
ρ, p Tµν J fa A Ω
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Of course, the actual structural equations relating these variables would be
extremely complex. However, for our purposes it is sufficient to evaluate the
mediating principles invoked at each step. They are:
(i) State equation of matter (analytic functional dependence).
(ii) Equation (9) (analytic functional dependence) plus extra-theoretical
(mathematical) symmetry considerations (e.g. Birkhoff theorem).
(iii) Einstein’s field equations (law of nature), weak field approximation,
Noether’s theorem (mathematical law), equation (16) plus boundary
conditions (e.g. ω(∞) = 0 or closeness).
(iv) Gauge fixing.
(v) Equation (10) (analytic functional dependence), gauge fixing.
We submit that, given the treatment of rotational frame-dragging pre-
sented in section 2, the above model faithfully captures the relevant physical
variables and their dependence for the phenomena in question. We also claim
that the above model is much more powerful and useful for causal analysis
purposes than standard counterfactual frameworks. In fact, our model can be
used either to analyze the general type of dependence relations in the formal
schema of rotational frame-dragging, which includes all cases from Einstein-
Lense-Thirring effect to general FLRW Machian cosmologies, or to analyze
the token relations in each of the particular cases just mentioned. For com-
parison, Lewis’ theory can only handle token cases. The great enhancement
in analytical power is evident when we try to assess the Machianity of the
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different occurrences of frame-dragging. First of all, the Machian hallmark
of frame-dragging is given by the fact that the exogenous variables represent
material degrees of freedom, making manifest Mach’s idea of material origin
of inertial effects. Moreover, all the considerations we have dispersed here
and there in section 2 are beautifully summarized in the list of mediating
principles (i)-(v). The less Machian cases feature “absolute” boundary con-
ditions in (iii), while more Machian cases feature a condition of closeness in
(iii), or even no boundary condition at all.
Coming back to the causality question, it is now clear why the stan-
dard counterfactual analyses of the dependence relation between J and Ω
performed so far gave an indecisive verdict - and why we cannot equate
frame-dragging to everyday instances of causation, such as the stone/window
case. Basically, the standard approaches systematically overlook both the
fine-grained linking structure between J and Ω and the dependence chain
upstream of J. So what is the verdict delivered by the SEM framework? We
note that all links except for (iii) are not strictly speaking justified by laws
of nature. The state equation for matter might count as a law in so far as it
constrains ρ and p, but it just establishes a functional dependence between
them and the stress-energy tensor. The abundance of non-lawlike mediat-
ing principles hints at the fact that the dependence involved is much more
logical/metaphysical than nomological. However we cannot speak of a pure
case of grounding here because the middle link (iii) involves Einstein’s field
equations. (The nomological link here “corrupts” the whole chain, in much
the way that a single stochastic link in an otherwise deterministic mechanism
makes the whole mechanism’s operation stochastic.) Furthermore, (iii) is the
most important link in the chain, since it connects the upstream variables
describing the overall material distribution with the downstream variables
accounting for the (geometrical) properties of local inertial frames. Thus, we
are in a situation where the “heart” of the chain depicts a nomological kind
of dependence, while the rest of the links point at a metaphysical one. In
our opinion, this mixed chain is the sign that a non-standard determination
relation is at work here.
The other reason to view the determination relation here as not a purely
causal relation has to do with the invertible nature of the connection be-
tween inertial (metrical) structure and matter distribution in GR. Although
the specific structure we laid out above is not directly invertible (that is,
one can’t input an Ω and derive the state of matter ρ, p by working the
mathematical derivations in reverse), it is nevertheless the case in GR that
the metric field directly determines the material distribution via Einstein’s
equations. So one could presumably construct a closely related causal graph
starting with a variable representation of the metric with more or less local
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precession and ending with a determinate quantity J of angular momentum
in the appropriate coordinate gauge. Once again, the field equations, which
are lawlike, would play a key role in justifying one of the middle links of the
graph, yet we would feel no temptation to consider the graph as establishing
a causal connection between Ω and J.
The fact that the graph would link things that are simultaneous in the
chosen coordinate frame or frames is not the reason why we would be reluc-
tant; the explanation lies elsewhere, in deeply held physical intuitions about
how spacetime structure and matter present in spacetime may relate to each
other. This is not the place to explore those intuitions, and whether they
ought to be defended or questioned. Our point is that the mathematical
connections may be just as tight if we run them in the opposite direction,
from a precessing metric to a quantity of angular momentum in the matter
distribution about the central point. Despite this, an intervention on the
central metric entailing a concomitant change in distant angular momentum
does not feel like a connection that reveals causation, but rather at most
a lawlike co-dependence relation. If we judge by the similarity of the two
dependence stories, we should judge them alike: both as amounting to a
non-standard determination relation that should not be held to be a clear
case of causation.
We finish this section by considering a possible no-go objection against
our reasoning. The objection goes like this: the frame-dragging effects we
are discussing are just the result of an approximation, so we should not read
too much into them, especially from a metaphysical perspective. To this
objection we reply that the approximation works extremely well for physically
realistic situations, where small velocities and weak gravitational fields are
involved, to the point that no higher-order corrections are needed to achieve
empirically adequate results (see Everitt et al., 2011). This is, we think, more
than a sufficient reason to investigate what kind of goings-on is captured by
(16), especially in light of the fact that nobody, to our knowledge, has been so
far able to come up with a higher-order derivation of frame-dragging effects
in GR.
5 What kind of dependence?
We have spent much of the previous section to establish what the depen-
dence relation underpinning frame-dragging effects is not. It is not straight-
forwardly causal, but it has too much physical import to be considered just
metaphysical. So it seems that we are looking at a strange new animal lurking
behind the bushes. The question then is: what is a frame-dragging relation?
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As we are going to see, the answer to this question is not univocal and is
open to debate. Roughly speaking, we can isolate two possible responses.
The first response, which we might call monist, takes to its extreme con-
sequences Wilson’s unificatory thesis for dependence relations. Hence, this
brand of monism would deny that the dependence depicted by frame-dragging
is half-way between causation and grounding. This is because there is just
one dependence relation – call it causation with a big “c”, grounding with a
big “g”, or what have you – so the metaphysics of windows shattering, that of
singletons, and that of frame-dragging is one and the same. The reason why,
so far, metaphysicians had the impression of dealing with conceptually differ-
ent cases is that they focused too much on details that cut no ontological ice.
From this perspective, the SEM framework is particularly useful in pointing
out what – according to monism – went wrong in the standard analytical
approach. In a nutshell, the issue boils down to the mediating principles jus-
tifying a structural model. To see this, let’s go back to the stone/window and
member/singleton cases. Both circumstances are modeled in the very same
way: same variables, same structural equations, same counterfactual pattern
instantiated. In other words, the SEM framework simply does not distin-
guish between the two dependencies. The only demarcation is given by the
mediating principles involved, but such principles are external to the analyt-
ical framework exploited. So, in some sense, mediating principles are just a
ladder used to reach the structural model and then kicked off once the model
is complete. As such, these principles have a pragmatic rationale but very
dubious metaphysical import. Another cue that might lead in this direction
is that there is no consensus over the metaphysical status of laws of nature,
some philosophers arguing that they are just another brand of metaphysical
principles (e.g. necessitarianism), some others going as further as claiming
that there is no such thing as laws of nature. Clearly, monism is an appealing
thesis in light of this debate, since it dispenses with the need of providing an
account of laws of nature in order to spell out what a dependence relation is.
On the other hand, monism has a huge downside in that it might be accused
of solving the issue by trivializing it. Indeed, dismissing the prima facie huge
conceptual differences among dependence relations as descriptive fluff seems
a rather unsatisfactory move. Usually, we clarify things up by adding details
to the description, not by blurring the whole picture.
Hence, one might consider an opposite, pluralist, response to the original
question. Pluralism differs from monism in that it takes the demarcation by
mediating principles very seriously from a metaphysical point of view. Thus,
under a pluralist reading of the SEM framework, causation and grounding
are distinct but related concepts. This means that dependence relations
are not sparse, but can be arranged in a scale depending on the type of
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principles mediating such dependencies. Hence, on one side sits causation,
which is mediated by laws of nature only, while on the opposite side sits
grounding, which is not mediated at all by laws of nature. In this picture, the
claim that frame-dragging dependence lies between causation and grounding
is literally true, since it is only partially mediated by laws of nature. In
this sense, frame-dragging dependence might be (unimaginatively) dubbed
“caunding” or something like that. The problem with this line of reasoning
is that it does not clarify whether such a dependence scale has just three
positions (nomological, mixed, metaphysical) or it covers a wider spectrum
capturing the degree of mixing. In this second case, a further criterion should
be provided for “counting” or “weighing” the lawlike links in a dependence
chain, in order decide the position in the spectrum of the corresponding
relation. Lacking this additional criterion, the question regarding the nature
of frame-dragging dependence remains only partially answered. Contrary to
monism, pluralism seeks indeed to provide a non-trivial, informative account
of dependencies by adding more details to the picture. However, the added
layer of complexity seems to bring new issues to the fore, rather than settling
the already existing ones. From this point of view, it is contentious whether
pluralism fares really better than monism.
6 Conclusion
Standard analyses of dependence relations are often aimed at well-behaved,
clear-cut cases taken from everyday life. For example, all of us have a clear
grasp of what it means for a lightning to determine a fire in the woods, or for
a marble to be colored in virtue of being red. These analyses commonly ex-
ploit tools such as Lewisian counterfactuals, and rely on demarcation criteria
given in terms of distinctions like events/facts, temporality/fundamentality,
synchronicity/diachronicity, contingency/necessity. In this paper, we have
tried to show that when it comes to fundamental physics, and GR in par-
ticular, things are not so straightforward. The lesson we have drawn from
this fact is that, perhaps, we should follow a new path in metaphysical the-
orizing. The blazing of such a trail has recently started with the work of
Schaffer, Wilson, and others on a generalized SEM framework that unifies
the – so far, disjoint – analyses of causation and grounding. What we have
done is basically to apply this framework to frame-dragging dependencies in
GR, showing that it is possible to deliver a (partial) characterization of the
underlying dependence relation, which is at least conceptually clearer than
that delivered by standard analytical frameworks. Of course, much more has
still to be said regarding such a relation in order to reach a full metaphysical
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characterization. However, as discussed in the previous section, this is part of
the broader issue of making full metaphysical sense of the tools provided by
the generalized SEM framework (in particular of the demarcation criterion
in terms of the laws of nature/metaphysical principles distinction). As such,
our work is just another preliminary step toward a full understanding of this
non-standard framework. A further step would be to investigate the nature
of the dependence relation underpinning geodesic motions in GR, looking for
possible differences with the frame-dragging case. In the end, the hope is
that a fully developed analysis of dependencies in spacetime physics might
help in solving the thorny issue of providing a clear metaphysical story for the
emergence of classical spacetime from an underlying quantum-gravitational
regime. At this stage, however, fulfilling this latter task lies far in the future.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to an anonymous referee and the editors of this volume for
their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Antonio Vassallo acknowl-
edges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and
Universities, fellowship IJCI-2015-23321.
References
Barbour, J. and H. Pfister (Eds.) (1995). Mach’s principle: from Newton’s
bucket to quantum gravity. Birkhäuser.
Bic˘ák, J., J. Katz, and D. Lynden-Bell (2007). Cosmological perturbation
theory, instantaneous gauges and local inertial frames. Physical Review
D 76, 063501.
Brill, D. and J. Cohen (1966). Rotating masses and their effect on inertial
frames. Physical Review 143 (4), 1011–1015.
Ciufolini, I. and J. Wheeler (1995). Gravitation and Inertia. Princeton
University Press.
Curiel, E. (2015). If metrical structure were not dynamical, counterfactuals
in general relativity would be easy. https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.03866.
Everitt, C., D. B. DeBra, B. Parkinson, J. Turneaure, J. Conklin, M. Heifetz,
G. Keiser, A. Silbergleit, T. Holmes, J. Kolodziejczak, M. Al-Meshari,
J. Mester, J. Mester, B. Muhlfelder, V. Solomonik, K. Stahl, P. Wor-
den Jr., W. Bencze, S. Buchman, B. Clarke, A. Al-Jadaan, H. Al-Jibreen,
22
J. Li, J. Lipa, J. Lockhart, B. Al-Suwaidan, M. Taber, and S. Wang (2011).
Gravity Probe B: Final results of a space experiment to test general rela-
tivity. Physical Review Letters 106, 221101.
Hoefer, C. (2014). Mach’s principle as action-at-a-distance in GR: The causal-
ity question. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 48,
128–136.
Huggett, N. and C. Hoefer (2017). Absolute and relational theories of space
and motion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/spacetime-theories/.
Lam, V. (2010). Metaphysics of causation and physics of general relativity.
Humana.Mente 13, 61–80.
Lindblom, L. and D. Brill (1974). Inertial effects in the gravitational collapse
of a rotating shell. Physical Review D 10 (10), 3151–3155.
Lynden-Bell, D., J. Katz, and J. Bic˘ák (1995). Mach’s principle from the rel-
ativistic constraint equations. Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical
Society 272, 150–160.
Mach, E. (1883). Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung, historisch-kritisch
dargestellt. Brockhaus. English translation by T.J. McCormack. Open
Court Publishing Co., 1893.
Misner, C., K. Thorne, and J. Wheeler (1973). Gravitation. W.H. Freeman
and Company.
Pearl, J. (2000). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge
University Press.
Pfister, H. (2007). On the history of the so-called Lense-Thirring effect.
General Relativity and Gravitation 39 (11), 1735–1748.
Pfister, H. and K. Braun (1985). Induction of correct centrifugal force in a
rotating mass shell. Classical and quantum gravity 2 (6), 909.
Schaffer, J. (2016). Grounding in the image of causation. Philosophical
Studies 173, 49–100.
Wilson, A. (2017). Metaphysical causation. Noûs. DOI 10.1111/nous.12190.
Wilson, A. (2018). Grounding entails counterpossible non-triviality. Philos-
ophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3), 716–728.
23
Woodward, J. (2016). Causation and manipulability. The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/
entries/causation-mani/.
24
